Version 3.0.0 - Loginless ‘Kiosk’
(use version 2.x.y for content authoring)
Decider is a web application that assists network defenders, analysts, and researchers in the process of mapping adversary behaviors to the MITRE ATT&CK® framework.
Produced For
Department of Homeland Security
Produced By
Homeland Security Systems Engineering and Development Institute
(HSSEDI™)
Code: Decider’s GitHub Repo
Notice: This project makes use of MITRE ATT&CK® - ATT&CK Terms of Use
Decider Kiosk is a loginless version of Decider meant to be hosted as
a publicly-accessible website.
User accounts, database-saved carts, and content authoring have all been
removed from the application.
The frontend was also cleaned up - to improve accessibility and
responsiveness.
The UI works on phones without issue.
Decider has 3 key features:
(structured progression through ATT&CK)
Decider’s homepage is the root of a question tree (matrix
level).
The answer cards on this page are Tactics (adversary
goals).
Clicking one progresses you along.
You descend down the hierarchy as such:
Matrix > Tactic > Technique
> SubTechnique
Once you reach a (Sub)Technique, you can view a detailed page about
it.
Should the description align with the adversary behavior you observed -
you can add the Technique to your shopping cart.
Answer cards can be:
(ability to search and filter all Techniques at once)
Search Technique IDs / names / descriptions using:
Filter Techniques by relevant:
(a place to store your mappings, add context, and export to files)
The ‘CTI Shopping Cart’ is a place where your mappings are stored.
Please create an issue / discussion on Decider’s GitHub.
No, Decider complements the ATT&CK website.
Decider does not contain all of the information that is available on
the ATT&CK website.
It primarily contains information on Tactics, Techniques, and the
Platforms / Data Sources related to Techniques.
The goal of Decider is to aid in mapping threat reporting / adversary
behaviors.
Once one has mappings - they can leverage the ATT&CK website for
further insights / next steps (i.e. detections, mitigations).
The mapping steps below follow those identified in CISA’s ATT&CK Mapping Guide. Analysts may choose their own starting point based on their familiarity with ATT&CK and the technical details / context available in the report.
Identify Tactics – Comb through the report to identify the adversary’s tactics and the flow of the attack. To identify the tactics (the adversary’s goals), focus on what the adversary was trying to accomplish and why. Review the tactic definitions to determine how the identified behaviors might translate into a specific tactic. Each tactic includes a finite number of actions an adversary can take to implement their goal. Understanding the flow of the attack can help identify the techniques or sub-techniques that an adversary may have employed.
Identify Techniques – After identifying the tactics, review the technical details associated with how the adversary tried to achieve their goals. Note: if you have insufficient detail to identify an applicable technique, you will be limited to mapping to the tactic level, which alone is not actionable information for detection purposes. Compare the behavior in the report with the description of the ATT&CK techniques listed under the identified tactic. If one of them matches, then it may be an appropriate technique. Be aware that multiple techniques may apply concurrently to the same behavior.
Identify Sub-Techniques – Review sub-technique descriptions to see if they match the information in the report. A match here may be an appropriate sub-technique. Read sub-technique descriptions carefully to understand the differences between them. In cases where the parent of a sub-technique aligns to multiple tactics, make sure to choose the appropriate tactic. Note: map solely to the parent technique only if there is not enough context to identify a sub-technique.
Consider techniques and sub-techniques as elements of an adversary’s playbook, rather than as isolated activities. Adversaries often use information they obtain from each activity in an operation to determine what additional techniques they will use next in the attack cycle. Because of this, techniques and sub-techniques are often linked in the attack chain.